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Abstract—Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a collection 
of autonomous nodes or terminals which communicate with 
each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. The 
conventional security solutions to provide key management 
through accessing trusted authorities or centralized servers 
are infeasible for this new environment since mobile ad hoc 
networks are characterized by the absence of any 
infrastructure, frequent mobility, and wireless links. We 
propose a hierarchical group key management scheme that 
is hierarchical and fully distributed with no central 
authority and uses a simple rekeying procedure which is 
suitable for large and high mobility mobile ad hoc networks. 
The rekeying procedure requires only one round in our 
scheme and Chinese Remainder Theorem Diffie Hellman  
Group Diffie Hellmann and Burmester and Desmedt it is a 
constant 3 whereas in other schemes such as Distributed 
Logical Key Hierarchy and Distributed One Way Function 
Trees, it depends on the number of members. We reduce the 
energy consumption during communication of the keying 
materials by reducing the number of bits in the rekeying 
message. We show through analysis and simulations that 
our scheme has less computation, communication and 
energy consumption   compared to the existing schemes.    
Keywords- mobile ad hoc network; key management; 
rekeying. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION   
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of 
autonomous nodes that communicate with each other, 
most frequently using a multi-hop wireless network. 
Nodes do not necessarily know each other and come 
together to form an ad hoc group for some specific 
purpose. Key distribution systems usually require a 
trusted third party that acts as a mediator between nodes 
of the network.  Ad hoc networks typically do not have 
an online trusted authority but there may be an off line 
one that is used during system initialization.   
Group key establishment means that multiple parties 
want to create a common secret to be used to exchange 
information securely. Without relying on a central trusted 
entity, two people who do not previously share a common 
secret can create one based on the party Diffie Hellman 
(DH) protocol. The 2-party Diffie Hellman protocol can 
be extended to a generalized version of n-party DH.  
Furthermore, group key management also needs to 
address the security issue related to membership changes. 
The modification of membership requires refreshment of 
the group key. This can be done either by periodic 
rekeying or updating right after member change. The 
change of group key ensures backward and forward 
security. With frequently changing group memberships, 
recent researches began to pay more attention on the 
efficiency of group key update. Recently, collaborative 
and group-oriented applications in MANETs have been an 
active research area. Obviously, group key management is 
a central building block in securing group 
communications in MANETs. However, group key 
management for large and dynamic groups in MANETs is 
a difficult problem because of the requirement of 
scalability and security under the restrictions of nodes’ 
available resources and unpredictable mobility.  
We propose a distributed group key management 
approach wherein there is no central authority and the 
users themselves arrive at a group key through simple 
computations. In large and high mobility mobile ad hoc 
networks, it is not possible to use a single group key for 
the entire network because of the enormous cost of 
computation and communication in rekeying. So, we 
logically divide the entire network into a number of 
groups headed by a group leader and each group is 
divided into subgroups called clusters headed by the 
cluster head. Though the term group leaders and cluster 
heads are used these nodes are no different from the other 
nodes, except for playing the assigned roles during the 
initialization phase and inter group and inter cluster 
communication. After initialization phase, within any 
cluster, any member can initiate the rekeying process and 
the burden on the cluster head is reduced. The 
transmission power and memory of the cluster head and 
the group leaders is same as other members. The members 
within the cluster communicate with the help of a group 
key. Inter cluster communication take place with the help 
of gate way nodes if the nodes are in the adjacent clusters 
and through the cluster heads if the are in far off clusters.. 
Inter group communication is routed through the group 
leaders. Each member also carries a public key, private 
key pair used to encrypt the rekeying messages 
exchanged. This ensures that the forward secrecy is 
preserved.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
focuses on the related work in this field. The proposed 
scheme is presented in Section III. Performance analysis 
of the scheme is discussed in Section IV. Experimental 
Results and Conclusion are given in Section V and 
Section VI respectively. 
  
II. RELATED WORK 
Key management is a basic part of any secure 
communication. Most cryptosystems rely on some 
underlying secure, robust, and efficient key management 
system. Group key establishment means that multiple 
parties want to create a common secret to be used to 
exchange information securely. Secure group 
communication (SGC) is defined as the process by which 
members in a group can securely communicate with each 
other and the information being shared is inaccessible to 
anybody outside the group. In such a scenario, a group 
key is established among all the participating members 
and this key is used to encrypt all the messages destined to 
the group. As a result, only the group members can 
decrypt the messages. The group key management 
protocols are typically classified in four categories: 
centralized group key distribution (CGKD), de-centralized 
group key management (DGKM), distributed/contributory 
group key agreement (CGKA), and distributed group key 
distribution (DGKD). 
 In CGKD, there exists a central entity (i.e. a group 
controller (GC)) which is responsible for generating, 
distributing, and updating the group key. The most famous 
CGKD scheme is the key tree scheme (also called Logical 
Key Hierarchy (LKH) proposed in [1] is based on the tree 
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structure with each user (group participant) corresponding 
to a leaf and the group initiator as the root node. The tree 
structure significantly reduces the number of broadcast 
messages and storage space for both the group controller 
and group members. Each leaf node shares a pairwise key 
with the root node as well as a set of intermediate keys 
from it to the root. One Way Function (OFT) is another 
centralized group key management scheme proposed in 
[2].similar to LKH. However, all keys in the OFT scheme 
are functionally related according to a one-way hash 
function  
The DGKM approach involves splitting a large group 
into small subgroups. Each subgroup has a subgroup 
controller which is responsible for the key management of 
its subgroup. The first DGKM scheme to appear was 
IOLUS [3].  The CGKA schemes involve the participation 
by all members of a group towards key management. Such 
schemes are characterized by the absence of the GC. The 
group key in such schemes is a function of the secret 
shares contributed by the members.Typical CGKA 
schemes include binary tree based ones [4] and n-party 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement [5, 6]. Tree Based Group 
Diffie Hellman (TGDH) is a group key management 
scheme proposed in [4]. The basic idea is to combine the 
efficiency of the tree structure with the contributory 
feature of DH. The DGKD scheme, proposed in [7], 
eliminates the need for a trusted central authority and 
introduces the concepts of sponsors and co distributors. 
All group members have the same capability and are 
equally trusted. Also, they have equal responsibility, i.e. 
any group member could be a potential sponsor of other 
members or a co-distributor. Whenever a member joins or 
leaves the group, the member’s sponsor initiates the 
rekeying process. The sponsor generates the necessary 
keys and securely distributes the keys to co-distributors 
respectively. The co distributors then distribute in parallel, 
corresponding keys to corresponding members. In 
addition to the above four typical classes of key 
management schemes, there are some other forms of key 
management schemes such as hierarchy and cluster based 
ones [6, 8]. A contributory group key agreement scheme is 
most appropriate for SGC in this kind of environment.  
Several group key management schemes have been 
proposed for SGC in wireless networks [9, 10]. In Simple 
and Efficient Group Key (SEGK) management scheme for 
MANETs proposed in [11] group members compute the 
group key in a distributed manner. Also, a new approach 
was developed in [12] called BALADE, based on a 
sequential multi-sources model, and takes into account 
both localization and mobility of nodes, while optimizing 
energy and bandwidth consumptions. Most of these 
schemes involve complex operations which is not suitable 
for large and high mobility networks. In Group Diffie- 
Hellman, the group agrees on a pair of primes and starts 
calculating in a distributive fashion the intermediate 
values. The setup time is linear since all members must 
contribute to generating the group key. Therefore, the size 
of the message increases as the sequence is reaching the 
last members and more intermediate values are necessary. 
With that, the number of exponential operations also 
increases. Therefore this method is not suitable for large 
networks. Moreover the computational burden is high 
since it involves a lot of exponentiations.  
Another approach using logical key hierarchy in a 
distributed fashion was proposed in [13] called Distributed 
One-way Function Tree (D-OWT) This protocol uses the 
one-way function tree. A member is responsible for 
generating its own key and sending the blinded version of 
this key to its sibling. Reference [14] also uses a logical 
key hierarchy to minimize the number of key held by 
group members called Diffie–Hellman Logical Key 
Hierarchy. The difference here is that group members 
generate the keys in the upper levels using the Diffie–
Hellman algorithm rather than using a one-way function. 
In Chinese Remainder Theorem Diffie-Hellman 
(CRTDH) [15] each member computes the group key as 
the XOR operation of certain values computed. This 
requires that the members agree on two large primes. 
CRTDH is impractical in terms of efficiency and security, 
such as low efficiency, possibly a small key, and 
possessing the same Least Common Multiple (LCM). 
However this CRTDH scheme was modified in [16] 
wherein the evaluation of the LCM was eliminated and 
other steps were modified slightly, so that a large value for 
the key is obtained.  In both these methods, whenever 
membership changes occur, the new group key is derived 
from the old group key as the XOR function of the old 
group key and the value derived from the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem values broadcast by one of its 
members. Since it is possible for the leaving member to 
obtain this message, and hence deduce the new group key 
backward secrecy is not preserved.    
    In this paper, we propose a distributed approach in 
which members contribute to the generation of group key 
by sending the hash of a random number during 
initialization phase within the cluster. They regenerate the 
group key themselves by obtaining the rekeying message 
from one of its members during rekeying phase or 
whenever membership changes occur. In a group the 
group key used for communication among the cluster 
heads is generated by the group leader and transmitted 
securely to the other clusterheads. The same procedure is 
used to agree on a common key among the group leaders 
wherein the network head generates the key and passes on 
to the other group leaders. Symmetric key is used for 
communication between the members of a cluster and 
asymmetric key cryptography for distributing the rekeying 
messages to the members of the cluster. 
  
III. PROPSED SCHEME  
A. System model 
The entire set of nodes is divided into a number of groups 
and the number of nodes within a group is further 
subdivided into subsets called clusters. Each group is 
headed by a group leader and a cluster by the cluster 
head. The layout of the network is as shown in Fig.1. One 
of the nodes in the cluster is head.  A set of eight such 
clusters form a group and each group is headed by a 
group leader. The cluster head is similar to the nodes in 
the network. The nodes within a cluster are also the 
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physical neighbors. The nodes within a cluster use 
contributory key agreement. Each node within a cluster 
contributes his share in arriving at the group key. 
Whenever membership changes occur, the adjacent node 
initiates the rekeying operation thereby reducing the 
burden on the cluster head. The group leader chooses a 
random key to be used for encrypting messages 
exchanged between the cluster heads and the network 
head sends the key to the group leaders that is used for 
communication among the group leaders. The 
hierarchical arrangement of the network is shown in 
Fig.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Network Layout 
The key management system consists of two phases 
(i) Initialization 
(ii) Group Key Agreement 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Hierarchical layout 
 
B.   Initialization 
Step 1: After deployment, the nodes broadcast their id 
value to their neighbors along with the HELLO message. 
Step 2: When all the nodes have discovered their 
neighbors, they exchange information about the number 
of one hop neighbors. The node which has maximum one 
hop neighbors is selected as the cluster head. Other nodes 
become members of the cluster or local nodes. The nodes 
update the status values accordingly.  
Step 3: The cluster head broadcasts the message “I am 
cluster head” so as to know its members. 
Step 4: The members reply with the message “I am 
member” and in this way clusters are formed in the 
network.  
Step 5: If a node receives more than one “I am cluster 
head” messages, it becomes Gateway which acts as a 
mediator between two clusters. 
In this manner clusters are formed in the network.   
The cluster heads broadcast the message, “Are there any 
cluster heads” so as to know each other. The cluster head 
with the smallest id is selected as the leader of the cluster 
heads which is representative of the group called the 
group leader. The group leaders establish communication 
with other group leaders in a similar manner and one 
among the group leaders is selected as the leader for the 
entire network. The entire network is hierarchical in 
nature and the following hierarchy is observed 
networkgroupclustercluster members 
 
C. Group Key Agreement within a cluster 
Step 1: Each member broadcasts the public key along 
with its id to all other members of the cluster along with 
the certificate for authentication.  
Step 2: The members of the cluster generate the group 
key in a distributive manner. Each member generates a 
random number and sends the hash of this number to the 
other members encrypted with the public key of the 
individual members, so that the remaining members can 
decrypt the message with their respective private key.  
Step 3: Each member concatenates the hash values of the 
received members in the ascending order of the ids and 
mixes it using a one way hash function on the 
concatenated string. This is the group key used for that 
cluster.   
Let HRi  be the hash of the random number generated by 
node i and GK denote the group key then  
GK=f (HR1   , HR2  , HR3  , ........... HRn)        
 where 
    HRi  = hash(Random number i)  
    f is  a one way function and 
hash is secure hash function such as SHA1. 
All the members now possess a copy of the same key as 
same operations are performed by all the nodes.  
 
D.  Inter cluster group key agreement 
The gateway node initiates communication with the 
neighboring node belonging to another cluster and 
mutually agrees on a key to be used for inter cluster 
communication between the two clusters. Any node 
belonging to one cluster can communicate with any other 
node in another cluster through this node as the 
intermediary. In this way adjacent clusters agree on group 
key. A set of eight clusters form a group. The cluster 
heads of each of these clusters mutually agree on a group 
key to be used for communication among the clusterheads 
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within a group in the similar manner. This key is different 
from the key used within the cluster. Going one level 
above in the hierarchy, a number of groups can be 
combined headed by a group leader and the group leaders 
agree on a group key to be used for communication 
among the group leaders which aids in intergroup 
communication.   
Even though we have considered that the network is 
divided into eight groups, each group consisting of eight 
clusters and each cluster consisting of eight members, it 
need not be constant. It may vary and this number does 
not change the manner in which group key is derived. This 
is assumed so that it gives the hierarchical appearance in 
the form of a fractal tree. 
E. Network Dynamics  
The mobile ad hoc network is dynamic in nature. 
Many nodes may join or leave the network. In such cases, 
a good key management system should ensure that 
backward and forward secrecy is preserved. 
1) Member join: 
When a new member joins, it initiates communication 
with the neighbouring node. After initial authentication, 
this node initiates the rekeying operations for generating a 
new key for the cluster. The rekeying operation is as 
follows. 
new node adjacent node : {authentication} 
adjacent node new node :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node all nodes:{rekeying message}k(old 
cluster key)  
  
The neighboring node broadcasts two random numbers 
that are mixed together using a hashing function and is 
inserted at a random position in the old group key, the 
position being specified by the first random number. The 
two random numbers are sent in a single message, so that 
any transmission loss may not result in wrong key being 
generated.  Let the two bit strings be 
I  Random no. = 00100010  
II Random no. = 10110111  
Suppose the result of mixing function is 11010110    
and the previous group key is  
10010100010101010001110000111100000110001000
0001 
The new group key is 
10010100010101010001110000111100000110011010
110010000001 
Since all members know the old group key they can 
compute the new group key. 
This new group key is transmitted to the new member 
by the adjacent node in a secure manner. 
2) Member Leave 
a) When Cluster Member leaves 
When a member leaves the group key of the cluster to 
which it belongs must be changed. This is changed in the 
similar manner as described above. The leaving member 
informs the neighboring node which in turn informs the 
other nodes about the leaving member. It also generates 
two random numbers and sends it securely to the other 
members which generate the group key.  
leaving  node adjacent node : {leaving message} 
adjacent node leaving node :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  node i :{rekeying message}pki  
b) When a gateway node leaves  
When a gateway node leaves the network, it delegates the 
role of the gateway to the adjacent node. In this case, the 
group key of both the clusters with which this node is 
associated need to be changed. When the gateway node 
moves into one of the clusters only the group key of the 
other cluster has to be changed. 
leaving  gateway node adjacent node : {leaving 
message + other messages for delegating its role} 
adjacent node leaving  gateway node 
:{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  node i  in cluster1:{rekeying 
message}pki     
adjacent node each  node j  in cluster2:{rekeying 
message}pkj    
c) When the cluster head leaves 
 When the cluster head leaves the group key used for 
communication among the cluster heads need to be 
changed. Also, the group key used within the cluster has 
to be changed. This cluster head informs the adjacent 
cluster head about its desire to leave the network which 
initiates the rekeying procedure. The adjacent cluster head 
generates two random numbers and sends it to the other 
cluster heads in a secure manner. 
leaving  cluster head adjacent cluster head : {leaving 
message} 
adjacent node leaving node :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  node i :{rekeying message}pki  
leaving  clusterheadadjacent clusterhead : {leaving 
message + other messages for delegating its role} 
adjacent node leaving  clusterhead :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  cluster headi  :{rekeying 
message}pki      
The group key of the clusterheads is obtained by 
taking the product of the two random numbers, inserting 
at the position of indicated by the first number and 
removing the initial bits old group key of the clusterheads 
and removing the bits equal to the number of bits in the 
product from the old group key. 
Suppose 
I  Random no. = 00101101  
II Random no. = 00111111  
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The product of the two numbers is00 00010101000110 
Suppose the old group key is  
10010100010101010001110000111100000110001000
000100110 
The new group key is  
00011100001111000001100010000000010101000110
000100110. Thus the cluster heads compute the group key 
after rekeying operation. This is the new group key for 
clusterheads within a group.Even the group key used for 
intra cluster communication in that particular cluster needs 
to be changed. This is changed in the manner described 
above for rekeying within the clauster. 
d) Whenever the group leader leaves 
 Whenever the group leader leaves all the three keys 
should be changed. These are 
(i) group key among the group leaders  
(ii)group key among the clusterheads and 
(iii) group key within the cluster 
leaving  group leader adjacent group leader:{leaving 
message + other messages for delegating its role } 
adjacent group leader leaving node :{acknowledge} 
adjacent group leader  each  group leaderi 
:{rekeying message}pki  
leaving group leaderadjacent node : {leaving 
message} 
adjacent node leaving group leader :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  node i in that cluster:{rekeying 
message}pki  
leaving  group leader adjacent clusterhead : {leaving 
message + other messages for delegating its role} 
adjacent clusterhead leaving  clusterhead 
:{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  cluster headi  :{rekeying 
message}pki   
leaving  node adjacent node : {leaving message} 
adjacent node leaving node :{acknowledge} 
adjacent node each  node i :{rekeying message}pki  
The first two group keys are changed in the manners 
described above. To change the group key of the group 
leaders, the leaving group leader delegates the role of the 
group leader to another cluster head in the same group and 
informs it to the other group leaders about this change. 
The adjacent group leader initiates the rekeying operation. 
It generates two random numbers, and sends it the other 
group leaders. The group leaders divide the old group key 
into blocks of size which is the same as the number of bits 
in the random number, perform the exclusive OR of the 
random number and the blocks of the old group key and 
concatenate the result to arrive at the new group key. 
Suppose the Random no. is 00100010 and the old 
group key is  
10010100010101010001110000111100000110001000
000100110101 
Dividing the group key into 8 bit blocks (size of the 
random number), we get, 
10010100 01010101 00011100 00111100 00011000 
10000001 00110101 
Performing the XOR operation and concatenating as 
shown,  
00100010  XOR  10010100 || 00100010 XOR 
01010101 || 00100010  XOR  00011100 || 00100010 XOR 
00111100 || 00100010   XOR   00011000  || 00100010  
XOR 10000001  || 00100010   XOR 00110101 
the following group key is obtained 
10110110011101110011111000011110001110101010
001100010111 
This is the new group key of the group leaders.  
F. Communication Protocol 
The nodes within the cluster communicate using the intra 
cluster group key. The communication between intra 
group and inter cluster nodes takes place through the 
gateway node, if they belong to adjacent clusters and 
through the cluster heads if the are in far off clusters. 
Sourcenodegateway nodeDestination node --- For 
adjacent  clusters 
Sourcenodeclusterhead(source)clusterhead(destinati
on)Destination node ---For far away clusters 
  
 
The inter group communication is through corresponding 
cluster heads and the group leaders as shown 
Source nodecluster head (source)group leader 
(source) group leader (destination) cluster head 
(destination) Destination node. 
   
For adjacent clusters 
 
             GKCL1                                                GKCL2 
Source node ------------->Gateway node ----------> 
Destination node 
For nodes in far off clusters 
 
    
GKCL1                           GKCH 
Source node ------------->Cluster head1 ----------> Cluster  
 GKCL2  
head1 -------------- Destination node 
 
 
 
       GKCL1         GKCH1 
Source node ------------->Cluster head1 ----------> Group  
     
                                  
 
 GKGR     GKCH2 
Leader1-----------Group Leader2--------------Cluster  
 GKCL2 
head2 ------------ Destination node 
92 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009 
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
A. Cost Analysis  
We compute communication cost of our scheme under 
various situations and for different network organizations. 
We also compare the communication cost of rekeying for 
various schemes. Some schemes such as GD-H use 1024 
bit message for rekeying whereas our seheme uses a 32 
bit meaasge and therefore the energy required for 
rekeying is very less. This is very important in energy 
constrained mobile ad hoc networks. 
Let us denote 
N= Network size 
M=Group Size 
P=Cluster Size 
G=No. of groups  
CH=Cluster Head  
CL=Cluster member 
GL =Group leader 
1) Member joins 
When a new member joins, the public key of the new 
member is broadcast to all old members encrypted with 
the old group key. Suppose the average number of 
members in a cluster is P, two 16 bit numbers or a 
message of 32 bits is transmitted to all the existing 
members encrypted with the old key. This scheme 
requires one round and 1 broadcast message . The group 
keys of other clusters need not be changed.    
2) Member leaves 
When a node leaves, there are three cases 
(i) The cluster member leaves 
(ii)The cluster head leaves  
(iii)The gateway node leaves 
(iv)The group leader leaves 
a) When the cluster member leaves  
The random numbers are sent to the existing 
members encrypted with their respective public keys and 
unicast to the existing members. Therefore this requires 
one round and P-1 unicast messages.  
b) When the cluster head leaves 
The rekeying is similar to member leave within the 
cluster i.e P-1 unicast messages and M-1 messages among 
the cluster heads for changing the cluster head key.    
c) When gateway node leaves 
The group key of both the cluster with which it is 
associated have to change the group keys. Therefore, this 
requires one round in each cluster and M-1 unicast 
messages in each cluster that is a total of 2 (P-1) 
messages. 
d) When the group leader leaves 
The group key of the group leaders , the group key of 
the cluster heads and also the cluster key of the cluster 
need to be changed. This requires one round and G-1 
unicast messages among the group leaders, M-1 unicast 
messages among the group leaders and P-1 messages 
within the cluster. 
 Table II gives the communication cost of rekeying for 
various schemes. In our scheme, the entire network is 
divided into a number of groups which in turn is divided 
into a number of clusters, wherein each cluster consists of 
members. When a member leaves, in the non hierarchical 
scheme, the key of the entire network needs to be 
changed. But in hierarchical scheme, it is just sufficient if 
the group key of the cluster to which it belongs is 
changed. The hierarchical scheme reduces the number of 
rekeying messages transmitted and this is shown in Table 
I. The communication between far off nodes (nodes in 
different groups) has to undergo 5 encryptions and 
decryptions whereas in non hierarchical schemes it is only 
one. In very large networks, this is tolerable compared to 
the enormous rekeying messages that need to be 
transmitted whenever membership changes occur. From 
this table we observe that the rekeying procedure requires 
only one round in our scheme and CRTDH and modified 
CRTDH, in GD-H and BD it is a constant 3 whereas in 
other schemes such as D-LKH and D-OFT, it depends on 
the number of members. Regarding the number of 
messages sent, BD method involves 2N broadcast 
messages and no unicast messages, whereas in our 
technique, the number of unicast messages is N-1. We 
also observe that CRTDH has the least communication 
cost among all the methods, but it does not provide 
forward secrecy because the rekeying message is 
broadcast and even the leaving member can derive  the 
new group key. Moreover, in our scheme the rekeying 
message is only 32 bits wide and thus the communication 
overhead is greatly reduced.   
TABLE I.  NO. OF  REKEYING MESSAGES FOR DIFFERENT 
NETWORK SIZES 
No. of nodes that receive 
rekeying messages 
(Our scheme) 
 Non- 
hierarchical 
scheme 
Network 
Organization 
 CL leaves 
or CL joins 
  CH 
leaves 
GL 
leaves 
 
N=256 
M=8 
P=16  
G=2 
  
Join -15 
(Broadcast) 
Leave-15 
32 34 256 
N=256 
M=4 
P=16  
G =4 
  
Join -16 
Leave-15 
32 36 256 
N=256 
M=4 
P=8  
G =8 
  
Join -8 
Leave-7 
40 44 256 
N=256 
M=4 
P=4  
G =16 
  
Join -4 
Leave-3 
68 72 256 
N=256 
M=2 
P=4  
G=32 
  
Join -4 
Leave-3 
68 70 256 
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TABLE II.  COMMUNICATION COST OF  REKEYING 
No. of messages Scheme  No. of 
rounds Broadcast Unicast 
Burmester and 
Desmedt(BD) 
  
3 2N  0 
Group-Diffie 
Hellman(GDH) 
N  N  N-1 
Distributed Logical 
Key Hierarchy                   
(D-LKH) 
3 1 N 
Distributed One Way 
Function Trees(D-
OFT) 
Log 2 N 0 2Log 2 N 
 CRTDH 1 1  
Modified CRTDH 1 1  
Our scheme(join) 1 1 0 
Our scheme CL (leave) 1 0 P-1 
Gateway leave 1 0 2(P-1) 
CH leave 1 0 M+P-2 
GL leave 1 0 G+P+M-3 
Let    
Exp=Exponential operation 
D=Decryption operation 
OWF=One Way Function 
X=Exclusive OR operation 
CRT=Chinese Remainder Theorem method for 
solving congruence relation 
i= node id 
M= Cluster size 
 
TABLE III.  COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
Scheme During Set up phase   During rekey 
 
Cluster head Members 
 
Burmester 
and Desmedt 
  
(M+1)Exp 
 
----- (M+1)Exp 
Group-Diffie 
Hellman 
(i+1)Exp 
 
------ (i+1)Exp 
Distributed 
Logical Key 
Hierarchy 
Log2(MExp) Log 2MD Log 2MD 
Distributed 
One Way 
Function 
Trees 
(Log 2M+ 1) 
Exp 
 
------ (Log 2M + 
1)Exp 
 CRTDH ----- LCM(M-1) 
+ (M-1) X 
+MExp + 
CRT 
LCM+X+CRT
leader 
CRT+Xmem
bers 
 Modified 
CRTDH 
------  (M-1) X 
+MExp 
+CRT 
X+CRT 
Our scheme 
 
Sort+ OWF Sort+ 
OWF  
D+OWF 
Multiplication(
CH leave) 
XOR(GL leave) 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
The simulations are performed using Network 
Simulator (NS-2.32) [17], particularly popular in the ad 
hoc networking community. The MAC layer protocol 
IEEE 802.11 is used in all simulations. The Ad Hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is 
chosen for the simulations. Every simulation run is 500 
seconds long. The simulation is carried out using different 
number of nodes. The simulation parameters are shown in 
Table III.  
 The experiment is conducted with different mobility 
patterns generated using the setdest tool of ns2. These are 
stationary nodes located at random positions, nodes 
moving to random destinations with speeds varying 
between 0 and a maximum of  5m/s, 10m/s and 20m/s. 
The random waypoint mobility model is used in which the 
nodes move to a randomly selected position with the 
speed varying between 0 and maximum speed, pauses for 
a specified pause time and again starts moving with the 
same speed to a new destination. The pause time is set to 
200 secs. Different message sizes of 16, 32, 48, 64, 128, 
152, 180, 200, 256, 512 and 1024 bits are used. We 
observed that in all the four scenarios the energy 
consumed by the node increases as the message size 
increases. This is depicted  in Fig.3. Since the nodes in a 
mobile ad hoc network communicate in a hop by hop 
manner, the energy consumed by all the nodes is not the 
same, even though same number of messages are sent and 
received by the nodes. This is clearly visible from the 
graphs. From the graph we observe that the energy 
consumed is less for a speed of 10m/s. This may be due to 
the fact that the movement brings the nodes closer to each 
other which reduces the relaying of the messages. The 
energy shown is inclusive of the energy for forwarding the 
message by the intermediate node. 
TABLE IV.  SIMULATION  PARAMETERS 
Parameters Values 
Simulation time 1000 sec 
Topology size  500m X 500m 
 Initial energy  100 Joules 
Transmitter Power 0.4W 
Receiver Power 0.3W 
Node mobility Max. speed 0m/s,5m/s, 10m/s, 
20m/s 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Traffic type CBR, Message 
MAC IEEE 802.11 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
Max. no. of packets 10000 
Pause time  200sec 
 
In the next experiment, we varied the cluster size and 
observed the effect of the cluster size on the average 
energy consumed by the nodes for communicating the 
rekeying messages. In this setup one node sends a 
message to every other node in the cluster. For P nodes, P-
1 messages are exchanged. This is indicated in Fig 4 for 
the mobility pattern of max. speed 20m/s. We observe that 
the energy consumed by the nodes increases as the 
network size increases and this is true with message sizes 
also. 
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Figure 3.  Average energy consumed by the nodes for various message 
sizes for cluster size of 8 nodes 
.   
Figure 4.  Average energy consumed by the nodes vs. message size for 
different cluster sizes with mobility pattern of max. speed=20m/s 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We proposed a hierarchical scheme scheme for group 
key management that does not rely on a centralized 
authority for regenerating a new group key. Any node can 
initiate the process of rekeying and so the energy 
depletion of any one particular node is eliminated unlike 
the centralized schemes. Our approach satisfies most of 
the security attributes of a key management system. The 
communication and computational overhead is small in 
our scheme compared with other distributed schemes. The 
energy saving is approximately 41% for 8 nodes and 15% 
for 200 nodes when the message size is reduced from 
1024 to 16 bits. This indicates that small message size and 
small cluster size is most suitable for energy limited 
mobile ad hoc networks. A small cluster size increases the 
overhead of inter cluster communication since it needs 
more encryptions and decryptions whereas a large cluster 
size increases the communication cost of rekeying. An 
optimal value is chosen based on the application. As a 
future work, instead of unicasting the rekeying messages, 
broadcasting may be done that will reduce the number of 
messages sent through the network.Since the leaving 
member should not have access to this information, doing 
this in a secure manner is a challenging task. 
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